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1  | CONCEPTUAL DE VELOPMENT OF 
MOR AL DISTRESS
When Jameton introduced moral distress (MD) to the nursing litera-
ture, he suggested that moral judgement and constraint were both 
necessary and sufficient conditions for MD, stating that MD only 
occurs ‘when one knows the right thing to do but institutional con-
straints make it nearly impossible to pursue the right course of ac-
tion’.1 Since Jameton, quantitative tools and scales have been 
developed to test and measure MD amongst nurses and other 
healthcare professionals (HCPs). Qualitative studies have provided 
experiential accounts of MD and more recently within the theoreti-
cal literature, exploration of the concept itself has occurred.
As debates about MD have continued, two groups of scholars 
have emerged: those who agree with Jameton’s ‘narrow definition’ 
(as Fourie2 has coined it), and those who argue Jameton’s definition 
is insufficient and needs to be broadened.3 We have outlined many 
of the major conceptual problems in a review of the literature.4 
Despite the continued debate about what it means to experience 
MD, there remains a lack of empirical research and conceptual liter-
ature dedicated to exploring the concept itself. We utilized an empir-
ical bioethics methodology to explore UK nurses’ understanding of 
MD through a combination of empirical investigation, theoretical 
 1Jameton, A. (1984). Nursing practice: The ethical issues. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice 
Hall.
 2Fourie, C. (2015). Moral distress and moral conflict in clinical ethics. Bioethics, 29(2), 
91–97.
 3Campbell, S. M., Ulrich, C. M., & Grady, C. (2016). A broader understanding of moral 
distress. American Journal of Bioethics, 16(12), 2–9.
 4Morley, G., Ives, J., Bradbury-Jones, C., & Irvine, F. (2019). What is ‘moral distress’? A 
narrative synthesis of the literature. Nursing Ethics, 26(3), 646–662.
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Abstract
There has been increasing debate in recent years about the conceptualization of 
moral distress. Broadly speaking, two groups of scholars have emerged: those who 
agree with Jameton’s ‘narrow definition’ that focuses on constraint and those who 
argue that Jameton’s definition is insufficient and needs to be broadened. Using femi-
nist empirical bioethics, we interviewed critical care nurses in the United Kingdom 
about their experiences and conceptualizations of moral distress. We provide our 
broader definition of moral distress and examples of data that both challenge and 
support our conceptualization. We pre-empt and overcome three key challenges that 
could be levelled at our account and argue that there are good reasons to adopt our 
broader definition of moral distress when exploring prevalence of, and management 
strategies for, moral distress.
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reflection and ethical argument. We have reported on the empirical 
data that underpins this analysis more fully in a previous paper.5 In 
this paper, we draw upon these data in a necessarily focused way to 
inform our ethical analysis and draw conclusions about how MD 
should be understood.
We chose feminist empirical bioethics as our methodology be-
cause feminist scholarship aims to uncover the social, political, phys-
ical and power differentials that are pivotal within everyday life and 
impact not only on which ethical concerns are deemed to be import-
ant but also how moral deliberation plays out.6 Feminist ethics de-
veloped as a movement against traditional moral philosophy, in 
which the moral agent is viewed as an autonomous actor, rationally 
deliberating from universal, abstract principles about the ‘right’ thing 
to do and ‘unburdened by the non-ideal constraints of luck (moral 
and otherwise), circumstance and capability’.7 Issues related to 
power, justice and constraint have emerged in previous literature as 
central to the experience of MD8 and we wanted to ensure our 
methodology would allow us to be sensitive to these issues if they 
also emerged in our analysis. This approach also had practical bene-
fits which will be highlighted in our analysis. First however, we will 
outline our overall methodological approach, before briefly summa-
rizing already published work that provides the foundation of this 
final stage of theorizing.
2  | METHODOLOGY
The theoretical underpinning of the project was feminist empirical 
bioethics because feminist ethical theory was combined with em-
pirical data to inform conceptual development and normative rec-
ommendations. Feminist interpretive phenomenology was the 
methodology used to collect and analyse the empirical data which is 
presented and described in a different paper.9 Ives’10 method of ‘re-
flexive balancing’ (RBL) was used to inform the ethical analysis and 
enables us to clearly articulate the relationship between the empiri-
cal, theoretical, and normative in bioethics research. RBL was se-
lected partly because it can accommodate commitment to the 
feminist ideals that underpinned this project from its inception, and 
partly because its theoretical foundations of sceptical pragmatism, 
modest moral foundationalism, coherence and compromise resonate 
strongly with the critique of current thinking on MD, in particular the 
need to agree upon a concept that is relevant to clinical nurses’ eve-
ryday experiences, coherent and rigorous.
RBL employs a quasi-moral foundationalism which accommo-
dates both the benefits of a coherentist framework of moral justifi-
cation—it remains broadly egalitarian as sets of beliefs can be 
introduced/ rejected based on coherence—and the benefits of foun-
dationalism, enabling a foundation from which to build our coherent 
belief set. Beliefs can therefore be treated as epistemically privi-
leged and posited as true for the purposes of moral enquiry. 
Importantly these beliefs are only treated as though they are epis-
temically privileged, they are not actually epistemically privileged 
and so they can still be altered, moved or replaced. In Ives’11 original 
method, these epistemically privileged beliefs are derived from em-
pirical data and are labelled ‘boundary principles’. Ives12 suggests 
that by deriving the boundary principles from the empirical data, 
this guards against researcher bias. However, we deviate slightly 
from this, also treating our commitment to ‘core feminism’ as a 
boundary principle: the commitment to seek and ‘eradicate traces of 
sexism and other oppressions wherever they may be found’.13 ‘Core 
feminism’ unites feminist theorists and commits them to the norma-
tive mandate of eradicating oppression.14 We justify this deviation 
on the basis that this principle is widely accepted and uncontrover-
sial. It would be difficult to argue that it is ethically justifiable to 
continue the oppression of women and marginalized individuals. 
Further, although using this core feminist commitment as a bound-
ary principle may introduce theoretical bias, we suggest it is a posi-
tive bias that aims for greater justice and equality, and is therefore 
coherent with feminist ideals.
Following our review of the literature (step 2), we first postulated 
a working definition that could be posited as a null hypothesis and 
used as a starting point for our ethical analysis (step 3).15 This defini-
tion was constructed as follows:
MD is the combination of:
(i) the experience of a moral event
(ii) the experience of ‘psychological distress’
and
(i) direct causal relation between (i) and (ii).
This provided us with a starting point that was justifiable in light of 
what has already been written and argued about MD.16 We then ex-
 5Morley, G., Bradbury-Jones, C., & Ives, J. C. S. (2019). What is ‘moral distress’? A 
feminist empirical bioethics study. Nursing Ethics. https://doi.org/10.1177/09697 33019 
874492
 6Walker, M. U. (2007). Moral understandings: A feminist study in ethics. USA: Oxford 
University Press; Jaggar, A. M. (2001). Feminist ethics. In L. C. Becker & C. B. Becker, 
Encyclopaedia of Ethics (pp. 528–539). New York: Routledge.
 7Gotlib, A. (2015). Feminist ethics and narrative ethics. Retrieved from http://www.iep.
utm.edu/fem-e-n/
 8Peter, E. & Liaschenko, J. (2013). Moral distress reexamined: A feminist interpretation of 
nurses’ identities, relationships, and responsibilities. Bioethical Inquiry, 10, 337–445; 
Fourie, C. (2017). Who is experiencing what kind of moral distress? Distinctions for 
moving from a narrow to a broad definition of moral distress. AMA Journal of Ethics, 19(6), 
578–584.
 9Morley et al., op. cit. note 5.
 10Ives, J. (2014). A method of reflexive balancing in a pragmatic, interdisciplinary and 
reflexive bioethics. Bioethics, 28(6), 302–312.
 11Ives, op. cit. note 10, p. 307.
 12Ibid.
 13Donchin, A. & Purdy, L. (1999). Introduction. Embodying bioethics recent feminist 
advances. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., pp. 1–13.
 14Ibid.
 15Ives, op. cit. note 10.
 16Morley et al., op. cit. note 4.
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plored how nurses’ lived experiences of MD might support, challenge, 
or help us further specify this working hypothesis. The details of this 
phase are published in,17 where details of the empirical methodology 
can be found, including the data analysis process and supplementary 
information including additional empirical data. Table 2 provides the 
demographic information of participants. Following this empirical 
work, we added the following clarifications to the working hypothesis 
for a more complete definition:
MD is the combination of:
(i) the experience of a moral event
‘Moral event’ could be any/combination of the following: moral 
tension, moral conflict, moral dilemma, moral uncertainty or moral 
constraint.
(ii) the experience of ‘psychological distress’
The term ‘psychological distress’ is an umbrella term that cap-
tures a variety of different negative emotions that may be expressed 
differently by each individual but the predominant emotions amongst 
these participants were anger, frustration, guilt, regret, sadness/
upset, powerlessness, symptoms associated with stress and feeling 
torn.
and
(iii) direct causal relation between (i) and (ii).
The data supported the idea that MD is conceptualized in UK nursing 
practice in broad terms, giving prima facie reason to consider a broader 
definition of MD as most appropriate. At this point in the project, we have 
a working account of MD that appears to be conceptually coherent and 
consistent with the lived experiences of UK nurses as we interpreted it.
However, this account is still susceptible to conceptual challenges 
and these challenges need exploring before we can expect others to 
accept our account of MD. What follows is a discussion of three key 
pre-emptive challenges to our account. This discussion is taken from 
the final stage of the RBL process, where we expose our working ac-
count to systematic challenge, and either revise it in light of that chal-
lenge, or provide a reasoned account of why it does not work.
3  | THREE CHALLENGES
3.1 | Challenge 1: Conceptual concerns
In this section, we will present four potential criticisms of our ac-
count based upon concerns that our definition of MD is too broad. 
We will present ethical justifications and a defence of our definition.
3.1.1 | The ‘term of art’ objection
The first proposed objection against our account is that MD is a term 
of art coined to capture the specific phenomenon of constrained  17Morley et al., op. cit. note 5.
TA B L E  1   Steps required for reflexive balancing and steps taken in this project
Steps required for RBL* Steps taken in this project
1. Identification of a moral problem: the problem could be rooted in 
practical experience, engagement with empirical literature or 
from theoretical considerations.
1. The issue of MD was first identified through GM’s experiences in 
practice and key questions regarding the concept raised through 
engagement with the empirical and theoretical literature.
2. Disciplinary naïve inquiry into the problem: this can be achieved 
either by data gathering, engaging with social science literature, 
philosophical theoretical literature, legal cases, politics and 
policy, and must be undertaken reflexively.
Aims are twofold:
a. To uncover and explore from multiple perspectives, all the 
values that operate on the problem and try to find some 
basic value propositions which act as quasi-foundational 
boundary principles.
b. To fully understand both micro and macro context of the 
problem, the way it is broadly conceived by the stakeholders, 
with the aim of uncovering recalcitrant experience.
2. Inquiry begins by systematically searching and reviewing the social science 
and theoretical/conceptual literature. Data gathered from stakeholders 
regarding their ethical experiences using feminist interpretive phenomenology. 
Reflexivity maintained throughout using a reflexive research diary.
a. Systematic literature review conducted, and a hypotheses definition 
of MD generated to be used as a boundary principle.
b. Stakeholders asked to describe ethical challenges and experiences of 
moral distress (micro), and how systems could support them (macro). 
Data analysed using Van Manen’s six steps and quasi-foundational 
boundary principles determined (i.e. beliefs about what MD is and 
what causes it). Data analysed individually and collectively to uncover 
both shared and recalcitrant experiences.
3. Reflexive balancing: identification of boundary principles (from 
2a), followed by systematically challenging those principles by 
actively searching for disconfirming data. If disconfirming data 
is found, the new boundary principle must be coherent with the 
others to be justified.
3. Hypothesis definition of MD derived from systematic review used as a 
starting point (boundary principle 1), and developed to make coherent 
with empirically identified beliefs about MD (boundary principles 2). This 
hypothesis account of MD was then exposed to systemic challenge from 
our commitment to ‘core feminism’ and other disconfirming/recalcitrant 
data, data from previous studies and theoretical literature. The data and 
theory that survives systematic challenges is used to form a coherent 
account of MD in UK nursing and how we ought to respond to it.
*Steps required for RBL is taken from Ives, op. cit. note 10. ‘Reflexive balancing’. 
4  |     MORLEY Et aL.
moral judgement observed by Jameton18 and that we ought there-
fore to preserve it,19 the objection being that a commonsense appeal 
to the words ‘moral’ and ‘distress’ is not enough to resolve the issue 
of what MD means. However, this argument does not provide a 
strong justification against reconceptualizing MD if doing so would 
increase its utility and relevance. Our response is that we should ex-
amine the key features of MD and if we find good enough reason, we 
ought to reconceptualize it.
3.1.2 | The ‘constraint is the only cause’ objection
The second, and indeed stronger argument, is that constraint simply 
is the only morally relevant cause of MD and therefore we have no 
need to broaden Jameton’s original definition. There is much empiri-
cal evidence to suggest that moral constraint both causes and char-
acterizes MD. The Moral Distress Scale (MDS) and Moral Distress 
Scale-Revised (MDS-R) have been used in multiple countries and 
contexts to capture the constraints that cause healthcare profes-
sionals to feel distressed.20 This is captured in the following quota-
tion from one study participant, Rachel: 
GM: I want to try and figure out, what do you think is the common-
ality between all of these experiences that you've had that 
have caused you to find them morally distressing? What do 
you think is at the core of it?
Rachel: I guess it's the unfairness, isn't it, in every aspect really. I 
think when it comes to end of life I don't think that's nec-
essarily unfair, I just don't want people to suffer and I want 
to make them comfortable […] but I think the most morally 
distressing things are when you disagree and you just think 
that's wrong, you're not doing what's best for the patient.
Rachel suggests it is the unfairness associated with moral con-
straint that makes an experience distinctly ‘MD’. Participants spoke 
about feelings of injustice, anger and frustration that arose because 
they felt morally constrained, and they characterized these experi-
ences as MD. However, participants also discussed other moral events 
that caused similar negative emotional responses. For example, an-
other participant, Elizabeth, suggested that MD is characterized by 
both uncertainty and constraint. 
GM: So, if I said to you, what is moral distress?
Elizabeth: I think for me it comes out of a feeling of emotional or 
physical distress when you either don’t feel like the right de-
cision, well you feel like you followed a course of action or 
been complicit in a course of action which wasn’t the correct 
one or where you are unsure as to whether it was the cor-
rect one, I think it can be either or, where yeah, that’s what I 
would, where you’re either faced with the decision or you‘ve 
already done it and you are thinking that wasn’t right or I 
don’t know whether that was right or I think it was right but 
I can’t be 100% sure. It happens all the time because you can 
never be 100%, yeah that’s what I’d say it was.
We will examine whether we can legitimately claim that uncer-
tainty also causes MD by comparing Elizabeth’s experience to a case 
study example provided by Campbell et al.21 of a junior surgeon who, 
 18Jameton, op. cit. note 1.
 19Campbell et al., op. cit. note 3; Morreim, H. (2016). Moral distress and conflict of 
interest. Americal Journal of Bioethics, 16(12), 27–29.
 20Corley, M. C., Elswick, R. K., Gorman, M. et al. (2001). Development and evaluation of a 
moral distress scale. J Adv Nurs, 33(2), 250–256; Hamric, A., Borchers, C, & Epstein, E. 
(2012). Development and testing of an instrument to measure moral distress in 
healthcare professionals. AJOB Primary Research, 3(2), 1–9; Papathanassoglou, E., 
Karanikola, M. N., Kalafati, M. et al. (2012). Professional autonomy, collaboration with 
physicians, and moral distress among European intensive care nurses. American Journal of 
Critical Care, 21(2), e41–352; Whitehead, P. B., Herbertson, R. K., Hamric, A. B. et al. 
(2014). Moral distress among healthcare professionals: Report of an institution-wide 
survey. Journal Nurs Scholarsh, 47(2), 117–125.
 21Campbell et al., op. cit. note 3.
TA B L E  2   Demographic information of participants*
Age range Number of participants













Junior (band 5 and 6) 12
Senior (band 7 and above) 9
Years in current role Years registered as a nurse
<1     3 < 1     0
1–3     10 1–3     3
3–5      6 3–5     3
5–10     1 5–10    12
10–20    1 10–20    1
20 +     0 20 +     2
Highest qualification
Bachelor’s degree in nursing 12
Diploma adult nursing/nursing 1





*Also published in Morley et al. op. cit. note 5. 
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they argued, was also experiencing MD because of uncertainty. We 
use this example because the arguments that Wocial22 and others level 
at this account could also potentially be levelled at our interpretation of 
Elizabeth’s account.
Campbell et al.23 provide the example of a junior surgeon who, 
they suggest, was uncertain about what to do when given a dispro-
portionate caseload of complex and potentially vulnerable patients. 
According to Campbell et al. the junior surgeon was worried that as 
a new surgeon he could harm these patients and he was morally un-
certain about what to do. Should he continue performing surgeries 
for these patients or should he raise his concerns with his seniors? 
Wocial24 argues that in this example, MD is not caused by uncer-
tainty but by an internal constraint and therefore falls within 
Jameton’s original definition and does not motivate a broader under-
standing of MD. Wocial suggests that Campbell et al.’s example is 
one of confidence rather than conscience and questions whether 
the junior surgeon’s reluctance to do the right thing is a political 
rather than moral choice. Both Wocial and Epstein et al.25 suggest 
that the surgeon is not really morally uncertain, he just lacks the con-
fidence to question his seniors and fears the potential repercussions 
of doing so. This could also be suggested of Elizabeth: she is not mor-
ally uncertain, like the junior surgeon, she just lacks confidence in 
her decisions, is fearful of a mistake and therefore morally distressed 
because she is internally constrained.
However, just because another moral agent can determine the 
correct course of moral action, does not mean the junior surgeon or 
Elizabeth could. Morreim might argue that both Elizabeth and the 
junior surgeon are just distressed because they are conflicted about 
the level of self-sacrifice they are willing to undertake and that feel-
ing ‘morally commandeered’ because of a constraint is different to 
‘moral puzzlement’ and feelings of regret.26 Indeed, different moral 
events may cause different emotional responses; however, if these 
emotional responses fall under the umbrella term ‘distress’, they 
would fulfil our broader definition. Furthermore, if they are experi-
encing distress because of the conflict between the ‘right’ thing to 
do and self-preservation, this again falls within our proposed broader 
definition and is an example of a moral conflict (moral event) be-
tween one’s personal and professional values causing psychological 
distress.
Wocial states: 
[E]ven if the surgeon does not know exactly what is the 
correct course of action, he recognizes a sense of re-
sponsibility, feels powerless, is concerned for patient 
well-being, and believes there is personal risk regard-
less of the path chosen and to do nothing simply to 
protect himself would compromise his integrity… His 
struggle represents an internal constraint and could 
easily fall into the current understanding of moral dis-
tress. No new definition is needed for this case.27
Here, Wocial is conceding that MD occurred whilst the surgeon 
feels morally uncertain but, she argues, because his experience already 
fulfils Jameton’s constraint criteria, there is no need for a new defini-
tion. However, in her theoretical paper, Fourie warns: ‘if we limit dis-
tress to cases of constraint we may be dismissing the real-life 
experiences of many nurses’.28 We do not contest that constraint is an 
important cause of MD and indeed this is supported by empirical data, 
but we agree with Fourie that if there is sufficient evidence to suggest 
there are other causes of MD then we should not dismiss these 
experiences.
However, is there good enough justification to broaden the defi-
nition of MD to include non-constraint experiences? Considering the 
boundary principles upon which our account must cohere and the 
commitment to attributing epistemic value to these accounts, we 
argue that disregarding these experiences or suggesting they are 
mistaken would be an act of testimonial injustice and would contrib-
ute to the oppression of these individuals. By denying that these ex-
periences fall within the lexicon of MD, we are preventing them from 
making sense of their own moral experiences and associated emo-
tions: a hermeneutic injustice (HI). Scully argues that an individual 
suffering HI will ultimately struggle to justify their choices and goals, 
make moral judgements and articulate their experiences as just or 
unjust.29 ‘In other words, through its [HI’s] effects on important fea-
tures of moral agency and identity, an impoverished epistemic capac-
ity is also partway to producing impoverished moral capacity’.30 To 
disregard these experiences as MD is, therefore, not only an epis-
temic wrong but a moral wrong, as we deprive these individuals of 
the tools to make sense of their own moral experiences. It may be 
argued that we can find ways to respect these reports without nec-
essarily incorporating them into the definition of MD but the ques-
tion remains, if they are not experiences of MD, then what are they?
One response could be that they are just ethically challenging 
experiences and moral problems that cause individuals to feel trou-
bled and upset, and do not need to be regarded as ‘MD’. However, 
this response also devalues these experiences, the implication being 
that some experiences are not distressing enough, or are not dis-
tressing in the right way, to constitute MD. The concept of MD now 
has power—especially in North America—and when individuals re-
port feeling morally distressed this implies that action should be 
taken to ameliorate their distress. Indeed, the power of the term can 
be seen in the recent responses to MD that have been developed, 
 22Wocial, L. D. (2016). A misunderstanding of moral distress. American Journal of 
Bioethics, 16(12), 21–23.
 23Campbell et al., op. cit. note 3.
 24Wocial, op. cit. note 22.
 25Ibid.; Epstein, E., Hurst, A. C., Mahanes, D. et al. (2016). Is broader better? American 
Journal of Bioethics, 16(12), 15–17.
 26Morreim, op. cit. note 19.
 27Wocial, op. cit. note 22, p. 22.
 28Fourie, op. cit. note 2, p. 97.
 29Scully, J. L. (2018). From 'She would say that, wouldn’t she?' to 'Does she take sugar?' 
Epistemic injustice and disability. International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics, 
11(1), 106–124.
 30Ibid: 112.
6  |     MORLEY Et aL.
such as Hamric and Epstein’s system-wide MD consultation ser-
vice.31 If these experiences are not regarded as MD, then such ser-
vices may never be established in other contexts, because (if 
restricted to constraint) the level of MD might be regarded as too 
low. Furthermore, these services would not need to address these 
experiences if they are not cases of MD. Latham suggests that a 
broader understanding of MD actually motivates a broader range of 
responses because it has ‘important consequences for the normative 
debate about what, if anything, one is obligated to do about one’s 
moral distress’.32 Indeed, there is value in the ability to label and 
name the experiences that many HCPs express during clinical ethics 
consultation.
Reflexive balancing (RBL) utilizes coherence as a standard by 
which to assess whether new beliefs ought to be incorporated into 
a body of knowledge. The most simple, justifiable and coherent an-
swer—which values and respects moral agent experiences—is that 
other moral events are capable of causing MD. There is a growing 
body of literature that supports this conclusion and suggests we gain 
a fuller understanding of MD by incorporating these experiences 
into the definition. Fourie, for example, suggests that Jameton’s em-
phasis on constraint actually distorts the situation.
Fourie argues: 
… a definition of moral distress, which makes con-
straint central to distress, seems to distort the reality 
of the situation. Whilst constraint may be present and 
its significance should not be under-estimated […] the 
case does not seem to be one that is accurately por-
trayed as being primarily about constraint: it is not 
simply that other people are arbitrarily or unfairly 
standing in the nurse’s way but that they genuinely 
disagree with the nurse on a moral basis.33
We suggest that there are good reasons to recognize these addi-
tional causes of distress and subsequently broaden our understanding 
of MD to accommodate them. There remain two more criticisms of this 
definition on the basis of historical and conceptual concerns.
3.1.3 | The ‘constraint is most common’ objection
The third objection is that the most common and most distressing 
cause of MD is constraint and the term should be reserved only for 
those experiences. Indeed, moral constraint was a common cause 
of MD discussed by participants and, through extensive use of the 
MDS and MDS-R, we have evidence to suggest that constraint 
causes MD in many other settings. However, we cannot say with 
certainty that it is the most common because other causes have not 
been widely accepted and thus have not been explored or measured 
to the same extent.
Regarding whether constraint causes the most distress, at-
tempting to characterize MD based on severity level again disre-
gards a great deal of moral experiences. Not only is it arbitrary 
to determine an MD experience based upon the severity of the 
distress, but it is also very difficult to measure and compare emo-
tional experiences. Individuals react to and express their emotions 
in a variety of ways and it would be unfair to discount an experi-
ence of MD on the basis that it is not distressing enough to con-
stitute MD ‘proper’.
3.1.4 | The ‘broadening makes it 
meaningless’ objection
The fourth criticism that we suggest could be levelled at this broader 
definition is the risk of making it ‘diagnostically and analytically 
meaningless’.34 Epstein et al.35 have similar worries as they stress the 
importance of a concept that is practical and which can help us to 
develop interventions to mitigate it. However, employing Fourie’s 
reclassification of MD into its causal constituents potentially pro-
vides a solution to this critique. Fourie suggests reclassifying narrow 
MD into ‘moral-constraint distress’, MD caused by conflict as ‘moral-
conflict distress’,36 to which we add those identified in our empirical 
work: ‘moral-uncertainty distress’, ‘moral-dilemma distress’ and 
‘moral-tension distress’.37 By sub-categorizing particular types of 
MD, researchers and clinicians could develop more specific meas-
ures and targeted interventions for MD. These sub-categories are 
broad enough to warrant slightly different interventions but are not 
overly specific.
Epstein et al. note that, ‘developing interventions for various 
subtypes would be extraordinarily challenging—how would one de-
velop and test an intervention for moral distress […] caused by moral 
uncertainty?’38 However, this does not provide sufficient justifica-
tion for disregarding other morally relevant causes of MD, especially 
if ultimately these interventions are more efficient. Indeed, report-
ing on the system-wide MD consultation service, Hamric and Epstein 
reflect upon the fact that they found MD and moral dilemmas were 
not always mutually exclusive.39 Recognizing that MD constitutes a 
broader range of moral events could improve such interventions.
To conclude this section, the charge that our definition is too 
broad is potentially the most damaging challenge. However, we have 
provided empirical data that suggests there are other moral causes 
of MD and that these other causes characterise some individuals’ 
 31Hamric, A. & Epstein, E. (2017). A health system-wide moral distress consultation 
service: Development and evaluation. HEC Forum, 29, 127–143.
 32Latham, S. R. (2016). Moral distress and cooperation with wrongdoing. Americal Journal 
of Bioethics, 16(12), 31–32.
 33Fourie, op. cit. note 2, p. 97.
 34Epstein et al., op. cit. note 25.
 35Ibid.
 36Fourie, op. cit. note 2.
 37Morley et al., op. cit. note 5.
 38Epstein et al., op. cit. note 25, p. 17.
 39Hamric & Epstein, op. cit. note 31.
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MD experiences.40 We have provided good theoretical reasons why 
it is coherent to accept other causes of MD and ethical reasons why 
we ought to value these experiences. We have also provided practi-
cal reasons why expanding the concept may help researchers to de-
velop more targeted responses. Importantly, we are not arguing that 
constraint does not cause MD, nor that broadening the definition 
makes moral constraint-distress any less worthy of action. In fact, 
we agree with Fourie41 who suggests that if nurses experience dis-
proportionate amounts of constraint distress (as seems likely consid-
ering their position in the hierarchy) then it is a matter of distributive 
justice that we continue trying to find ways to alleviate this 
distress.
3.2 | Challenge 2: Epistemological concerns
Jameton’s and subsequent conceptions of MD have been built upon 
the assertion that MD only occurs when one has made a moral 
judgement but is constrained.42 In this section, we address what we 
anticipate to be the second substantial challenge to our broad defini-
tion—that moral judgement ought to be regarded as a necessary con-
dition of MD. To respond to this, we first need to establish what is 
meant by the term ‘moral judgement’ because the terminology 
within the literature is currently ambiguous.
In this section, we argue that ‘moral judgement’ should be under-
stood in a weak sense and should not be regarded as a necessary or 
sufficient condition of MD. The first reason for this is the variation 
and ambiguity regarding the way participants framed their moral 
judgements within their narratives. Below, we provide six excerpts 
from the data. In each of these excerpts, participants articulate their 
moral judgement in different ways: 
1. ‘No matter how right I knew I was on a practical level, you 
know, seeing how it made her feel, it just, made me feel 
guilty’ (Beth).
2. ‘I don't think he should ever have been trach'ed…’ (Joyce).
3. ‘…with lots of situations there are patients that you just think, 
what are we doing?’ (Rachel).
4. ‘…you just feel like you’re not doing the right thing with…’ 
(Elizabeth).
5. ‘…you’re in torment and conflict because of the morality, the right-
ness or wrongness of a situation…’ (Holly).
6. ‘…it doesn’t matter about my feelings because it’s about the family, 
and it’s about the patient and what they decided and so whatever 
my opinions on the subject, they aren’t relevant…’ (Amelia),
In the first quotation, Beth suggests she knew the right thing 
concerning the practical issue but expressed uncertainty about the 
ethical issue. In the second and third quotations, Joyce and Rachel 
both suggested thinking they knew and in the fourth Elizabeth dis-
cussed feeling she knew. In the fifth, Holly articulates feeling tor-
mented and conflicted, and seems to be uncertain; and lastly, Amelia 
says that her feelings and opinions do not even matter. Participants 
most commonly expressed their judgements in terms of empathetic 
feeling rather than rules or judgements, which Jaggar suggests may 
reflect a more feminist approach to ethics.43 Participants described 
a ‘feeling of knowing’ more akin to a moral intuition than a judge-
ment, and they do not indicate certainty, which suggests MD can 
occur in a variety of epistemic states.
This variation in expression mirrors the variation in the existing 
definitions of MD (these can be found in.44 The variation and subse-
quent ambiguity seems to suggest that we should not take ‘moral 
judgement’ in its strongest sense but rather accept that MD occurs 
along a spectrum of epistemic strength.
The second reason we suggest moral judgement should be un-
derstood in its weakest sense is because of the complexity of clin-
ical-ethical decision making and prognostication. As Gallagher 
et al. highlight, medical decision making and prognostication are 
rife with uncertainty, and yet form the basis of clinical ethical de-
cision making.45 If we accept that the ethical supervenes on the 
natural, then it seems likely that clinical uncertainty creates ethical 
uncertainty, and our empirical evidence suggests this results in 
distress.46 Indeed, many participants discussed the difficulties of 
accurate prognostication and as Elizabeth describes, she experi-
enced distress because she felt that decision making was just 
guesswork—that they were gambling with other peoples’ 
existence: 
I think the distress comes from that rock and a hard 
place and that’s definitely the crux of it, it’s like I 
don’t feel comfortable standing here and it’s been 
months and months and months and just I feel like 
I’m dragging out this family’s pain and I may be drag-
ging out your pain to like what end… and why are we 
doing this? And this doesn’t seem right and this 
doesn’t seem fair or nice. But on the other side 
you’ve got what feels like sometimes a little bit of a 
like educated guess… those are the ones that pop up 
in the night you know those are the faces …and yeah 
it’s that rock and a hard place, it’s that gamble on 
someone else’s existence, well it is, you’re gambling 
 40Morley et al., op. cit. note 5.
 41Fourie, C. (2016). The ethical significance of moral distress: Inequality and nurses' 
constraint-distress. American Journal of Bioethics, 16(12), 23–25.
 42Jameton, op. cit. note 1.; Jameton, A. (1993). Dilemmas of moral distress: Moral 
responsibility and nursing practice. AWHONNS Clincial Issues in Perinatal and Womens 
Health Nursing, 4(4), 542–551.
 43Jaggar, op.cit., note 6.
 44Morley et al., op. cit. note 4.
 45Gallagher, A., Bousso, R, S., McCarthy, J. et al. (2015). Negotiated reorienting: a 
grounded theory of nurses' end-of-life decision-making in the intensive care unit. 
International Journal of Nursing Studies, 52(4), 794–803.
 46Morley et al., op. cit. note 5.
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on their existence and what state that existence will 
be. (Elizabeth)47
Other researchers have also suggested that the inherent un-
certainty in prognostication and end-of-life decision making 
causes MD. Oberle and Hughes interviewed nurses and doctors 
in acute care areas about their perceptions of ethical problems 
during end-of-life care. They found the ‘defining feature’ of end-
of-life decision making was uncertainty, and this was a source of 
MD. They stated: 
…uncertainty about probable outcomes was the de-
fining feature, leading to considerable deliberation 
and reflection about the ‘right thing to do’. At what 
point did patient suffering outweigh the probability of 
a positive outcome, and at what point should treat-
ment be stopped? Even in the so-called futile cases 
there remained the possibility, however slight, that a 
positive outcome might result from further 
treatment.48
Dzeng49 reflects upon interviews she conducted with physicians 
regarding their experience of end-of-life care and she describes the 
distress they experienced because of the use of new technologies 
such as extracorporeal membrane oxygenation and left ventricular 
assist devices that create liminal states between life and death. 
Dzeng describes how these physicians reported feeling unprepared 
to deal with these situations both clinically and ethically, and that 
‘this uncertainty further contributes to moral distress’.50 We suggest 
that this acknowledgement of the uncertainty surrounding end-of-
life care and medical prognostication should extend to a greater 
awareness that ethical decisions based on clinical uncertainty are 
likely to involve moral uncertainty, and uncertainty can itself be a 
cause of MD.
Some authors suggest that acknowledging MD as a sign of 
uncertainty can help teams to reach agreement. Reflecting on a 
clinical ethics case, April and April suggest that had they ‘ap-
proached our patient’s sad case through the traditional frame of 
moral distress, we might have concluded that we were certain 
the right choice was to respect the patient’s autonomy and min-
imize further harm’.51 However, interpreting their feelings of MD 
more broadly (as suggested by Campbell et al.52), they instead 
approached the case as one of ‘moral disagreement among 
sincere and well-intentioned stakeholders’,53 rather than as a 
case of ‘the moral white knight who alone knows the right choice 
and struggles bravely against others’.54 As Johnstone and 
Hutchinson have argued, Jameton’s conception perpetuates 
nurses’ belief that their moral judgements are correct and justi-
fied suggesting that other HCPs are simply arbitrarily disagree-
ing and this shuts down communication and undermines the 
process of moral deliberation.55 This has the further potential of 
simply increasing anger and resentment between HCPs and 
eroding relationships, whereas acknowledging that nurses and 
other HCPs may experience MD when they feel torn, conflicted 
and uncertain could, as April and April suggest, help to bring 
clinicians together in shared uncertainty and reduce barriers be-
tween clinicians.56
Furthermore, Haidt suggests that anger is a negative moral 
emotion that has a narrowing effect that closes individuals off 
from others’ viewpoints, whereas positive moral emotions have a 
broadening effect that can make individuals more open to new 
ideas, new relationships and new possibilities.57 In combination 
with environmental and institutional changes this could help en-
courage dialogue between HCPs, so that as a team they can recog-
nize the complexity of moral decision making and reach moral 
decisions together, thus increasing the potential for moral commu-
nities to grow. Indeed, April and April believe a broader under-
standing of MD helped them to foster the mutual understanding 
required to reach consensus.58
Finally, in a recent green paper, Batho and Pitton argue that 
‘knowledge of the right course of action’ sets an ‘epistemic thresh-
old’ that is too high for MD.59 They suggest that it is entirely plausi-
ble that the moral agent experiencing MD may feel indeterminate 
about the morally appropriate action, or even fail to even see the 
options available to her. Indeed, the moral agent may not recognize 
the cause of their distress, or even be able to identify the moral op-
tions available to her but, nonetheless, it still seems plausible to sug-
gest that she feels MD.
Batho and Pitton suggest that an account of MD should avoid 
both this ‘epistemic threshold’ and the ‘objectivity constraint’: that 
the agent must be aware of all the options available to her. They 
suggest that many previous accounts of MD fail to recognize that 
MD ‘is primarily a function of how the world appears to the indi-
vidual, which may be different from how the world objectively 
happens to be’ and that MD should not depend on ‘the world 
 47Morley et al., op. cit. note 5.
 48Oberle, K. & Hughes, D. (2001). Doctors’ and nurses’ perceptions of ethical problems 
in end-of-life decisions. J Adv Nurs, 33(6), 707–715.
 49Dzeng, E. (2017). Navigating the liminal state between life and death: Clinician moral 
distress and uncertainty regarding new life sustaining technologies. Americal Journal of 
Bioethics, 17(2), 22–25.
 50Ibid: 23.
 51April, C. W. & April, M. D. (2016). Understanding moral distress through the lens of 
social reflective equilibrium. American Journal of Bioethics, 16(12), 25–27.
 52Campbell et al., op. cit. note 3.
 53April & April, op. cit. note 51, p. 27.
 54Ibid.
 55Johnstone, M. J. & Hutchinson, A. (2015). 'Moral distress'—time to abandon a flawed 
nursing construct? Nursing Ethics, 22(1), 5–14.
 56April & April, op. cit. note 51.
 57Haidt, J. (2003). The moral emotions. In R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer, & H. H. 
Goldsmith, Handbook of affective sciences. Oxford University Press. http://facul ty.virgi 
nia.edu/haidt lab/artic les/alter nate_versi ons/haidt.2003.the-moral -emoti ons.pub02 
5-as-html.html
 58April & April, op. cit. note 51.
 59Batho, D. & Pitton, C. (2018). What is moral distress? Experiences and responses. The 
University of Essex, 1–33.
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actually being as she understands it to be’.60 Indeed, MD is a 
unique phenomenon, caused and experienced differently by indi-
viduals. We ought to trust individual experiences of MD to inform 
the concept, as only they can provide an account of how the world 
appears to be to them: only a broad definition can capture these 
unique, individual experiences.
3.3 | Challenge 3: Ideological concerns
Some authors have attempted to explain the concept of MD by sug-
gesting that it occurs when one’s moral integrity is violated.61 
Suggesting that compromised integrity is the defining feature of MD 
allows authors to avoid the conclusion that the moral agent knows 
with certainty the right thing to do, because the terminology is vague 
enough to capture a breadth of situations; it also allows authors to 
retain the spirit of Jameton’s original conception by suggesting con-
strained moral agency is central. However, we are reluctant to use an 
ill-defined concept such as integrity to try and bring conceptual clarity 
because, we suggest, it only defers the problem of definition.
Batho and Pitton suggest that the notion of integrity is unclear. 
To gain clarity, they analysed seven accounts of MD in the existing 
literature which ‘endorse the claim […] that central to moral distress 
is the experience of loss of moral integrity’.62 They argue that in all 
seven cases studies, distress was articulated because individuals felt 
compromised as a person and that this feeling of compromise cap-
tures loss of integrity. However, it is also unclear what is meant by 
feeling compromised as a person and this account again seems only 
to defer the problem. Furthermore, their account can be challenged 
methodologically.
The authors selected accounts of MD in which all the moral 
agents describe situations in which they believe a moral wrong oc-
curred. Second, the authors do not describe how they selected their 
accounts and, upon exploring their sources, it can be concluded that 
they are not representative and do not provide a broad spectrum of 
MD experiences. Their selected sources already seem to frame MD 
in a specific way, and this seems to have biased their conception of 
MD. One case was taken from a website which is concerned with 
protecting HCPs’ conscience. On the first page of the website, it 
states: ‘The Protection of Conscience Project supports health care 
workers who want to provide the best care for their patients without 
violating their own personal and professional integrity’.63 Case study 
7 is taken from a paper by Hardingham64 who also frames MD in 
terms of moral integrity, and three cases were taken from a special 
issue of a bioethics journal edited by a prominent US MD scholar 
who also frames MD in terms of compromised moral integrity. 
Therefore, their method of case analysis is not the naïve phenome-
nological inquiry they suggest it is. Instead, the case studies appear 
to have been cherry-picked to support a pre-analytic understanding 
of the centrality of integrity to MD. Batho and Pitton65 have not pro-
vided a convincing argument regarding how a ‘feeling of being com-
promised’ clarifies MD and instead seem to have again deferred the 
problem.
Our secondary reason for not including integrity into our sug-
gested definition is because the participants did not frame their 
experiences in this way and therefore the data did not provide any 
mandate to frame MD in these terms. The actual word ‘integrity’ 
was only referred to once amongst 21 participants and even when 
reviewing themes that could potentially relate to integrity such as 
‘conscience’ or ‘moral compass’, these were only mentioned by three 
participants one or two times. Even when searching for potentially 
related concepts or allusions to integrity, our interpretation of the 
data did not indicate integrity as a theme. The theme that potentially 
bears the most similarities to integrity is that of personal/profes-
sional values and responsibilities. However, again, when participants 
discussed feeling conflicted or constrained, they framed these ex-
periences in terms of responsibilities and values, not integrity. This 
suggests that amongst this group of UK nurses, experiencing MD 
did not necessarily entail a violation of moral integrity. Of course, it 
is possible that with a different, perhaps larger sample size, or a sam-
ple from a different country, moral integrity could still arise as part 
of the experience of MD. However, the question remains whether 
including moral integrity within the definition of MD really brings 
clarity or, as we suggest, further confuses the concept by deferring 
the problem of definition.
Finally, we suggest that framing compromise in this way perpet-
uates the belief that compromise itself is bad. Batho and Pitton66 
indicate that feeling compromised suggests an individual is both a 
perpetrator and a victim, because they are unable to fulfil their 
deeply held beliefs. However, the ability to set one’s own values 
aside is often the key to achieving compromise. Reflecting on an ex-
perience shared by one participant (Max), he discussed feeling mor-
ally distressed because he was uncertain about whether he agreed 
with the decision to withdraw LST from a patient who was awake 
and had decided he wanted the IABP that was sustaining his cardiac 
output to be removed. Max may have felt very strongly that this was 
the wrong thing to do, and participating in this may have made him 
feel compromised as a person. However, this does not mean the de-
cision was morally wrong for the patient. There is a very difficult 
balance that needs to be struck in healthcare between HCPs pro-
tecting and honouring their own values and beliefs, whilst also re-
maining cognizant that they have a duty of care and responsibility to 
 60Ibid: 7.
 61For example, American Association of Critical-Care Nurses, AACN (2006). Public policy 
position statement: Moral distress. CA, USA; Canadian Nurses Association (2008). Code 
of ethics for registered nurses. Ottawa; Hamric, A. (2006). Case study of moral distress. 
Journal of Hospice and Palliative Nursing 2014, 16(8), 457–463; Thomas, T. & McCullough, 
L. (2015). A philosophical taxonomy of ethically significant moral distress. Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy, 40, 102–120.
 62Batho & Pitton, op. cit. note 59, p. 15.
 63www.consc ience laws.org
 64Hardingham, L. (2004). Integrity and moral residue: nurses as participants in a moral 
community. Nursing Philosophy, 5, 127–134.
 65Batho & Pitton, op. cit. note 59.
 66Ibid.
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patients. Framing compromise of one’s values in the way Batho and 
Pitton67 propose suggests that compromise itself is bad. An unwill-
ingness to compromise one’s own values may make one more inflex-
ible and reluctant to engage in the moral compromise that is often 
required in healthcare.
When faced with having to choose a course of action in re-
sponse to a moral problem, sometimes the only way to move for-
ward is through compromise, whether this is a compromise with 
others, or a setting aside of one’s own values. As Huxtable has 
argued: 
[C]omplexity and uncertainty, both in the realm of 
values and in the realm of facts (as far as these can be 
separated), are at the centre of the case for compro-
mise. But so too are inadequate resources and the in-
ability to honour every competing value, coupled with 
a prudent desire to ensure that one's values are 
voiced, an ongoing relationship with one's moral op-
ponents and the need to reach a decision on a con-
tested issue. The circumstances are ripe for 
compromise when such features are present in suffi-
cient number or scale. The achievement of a princi-
pled compromise presumes communication and 
negotiation between the positions available and their 
respective defenders.68
By reframing compromise in this way, it can be seen as a positive 
by-product of moral decision making rather than inevitably causing 
distress. Again, this could also help to encourage moral communities to 
grow. Rather than HCPs engaging in conflict with the aim of avoiding 
compromise to maintain one’s integrity, individuals could instead come 
together with compromise as their aim.
Excluding integrity from the definition of MD is a pragmatic and 
coherent conclusion in line with the method of RBL. It is justified be-
cause integrity did not emerge as a finding in the empirical data, it is 
coherent because the inclusion of integrity provides no further con-
ceptual clarification, and it is pragmatic because it paves the way for 
recognizing that compromise between HCPs, families and patients is 
both inevitable and potentially positive.
4  | CONCLUSION
We have presented three possible objections to our broader defini-
tion of MD and pragmatic, justifiable and coherent responses re-
garding why this broader definition should be adopted. Importantly, 
our definition of MD is grounded in participants’ reports of MD ex-
periences. These empirical data support theoretical arguments, also 
made by others, that the definition of MD should be broadened.69 In 
empirical bioethics, the aim of the researcher is not to simply accept 
participants accounts but to maintain a ‘critical stance’, thus enabling 
the formation of normative conclusions.70 Due to our feminist com-
mitment to uncover and address oppressive practices, we grounded 
our normative arguments with these values and argued that denying 
these participants experiences are MD would be an act of testimo-
nial and hermeneutic injustice. We have tried to pre-empt the main 
objections to our account by using deviant cases from our data and 
others’ arguments in the literature. Importantly, we have argued that 
broadening the definition may also have practical benefits as it may 
help to break down barriers between healthcare professionals and 
help moral communities grow. For those that may argue MD (as de-
scribed by Jameton) is a ‘term of art’ and broadening the concept 
makes it analytically and diagnostically meaningless, we suggest 
sub-categorizing MD according to its cause, as suggested by Fourie. 
Sub-categorizing MD into different types provides a compromise 
between those who think the broader conception captures their 
ethical experiences and those who suggest that central to MD is 
constraint. By striking this middle ground, we suggest that MD will 
not become so broad that it is meaningless, but instead we can be 
even more specific about the cause of distress which will ultimately 
enable us to develop more targeted and effective interventions to 
mitigate its negative effects. We suggest that a promising direction 
for future research would be an exploration of which types of MD 
seem to be most commonly experienced amongst different groups 
of healthcare professionals in various settings, and identifying 
whether targeted interventions do in fact mitigate these different 
types of MD.
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